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Resumo: As doutrinas psicológicas do Empirismo, Associacionismo e Hedonismo serviram de fontes
intelectuais para o desenvolvimento do Utilitarismo no século XVIII e da psicofísica no século XIX. O
Utilitarismo, articulado primeiramente por Bentham em 1781, apresenta quatro pressupostos psicofísicos
implícitos, embora importantes: 1) que utilidade, que reflete “benefício, vantagem, prazer, bem, ou felicidade”,
são conceitos quintessencialmente psicológicos; 2) que utilidades são quantitativas; 3) que utilidades são
comensuráveis através de diferentes objetos; e 4) que utilidades são comensuráveis entre indivíduos. Embora
as utilidades algumas vezes refletem a satisfação de necessidades biológicas, elas comumente representam
valências ou valores psicológicos, cujas forças subjetivas podem elas mesmas derivar, dinamicamente, de
processos de tomada de decisão.
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UTILITARIANISM: A PSYCHOPHYSICAL PERSPECTIVE
Abstract: The psychological doctrines of empiricism, associationism, and hedonism served as
intellectual sources for the development of utilitarianism in the 18th century and psychophysics in the 19th.
Utilitarianism, first articulated by Bentham in 1781, makes four implicit but nevertheless important
psychophysical assumptions: (1) that utilities, which reflect “benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness,”
are quintessentially psychological concepts; (2) that utilities are quantitative; (3) that utilities are commensurable
across different objects; and (4) that utilities are commensurable across individuals. Although utilities sometimes
reflect the satisfaction of biological needs, they commonly represent psychological valences or values, whose
subjective strengths may themselves derive, dynamically, from processes of decision-making.
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Over the centuries, in weaning itself from its
philosophical parents and emerging as an independent
discipline, psychology established, developed, and
elaborated a small number of core concepts and
principles, three of which are notable. The principle
of empiricism takes experience with the world as a
primary means for shaping our minds and behaviors.
The principle of association claims that spatial and
temporal contiguities can account for the links between
mental events, and between behavioral responses and
stimuli. And the principle of hedonism regards
pleasures and pains as central psychological forces
that spur people to act, through biologically and
culturally shaped systems of rewards and punishments.
The principles of empiricism, associationism,
and hedonism merged in the 18th century, notably in
the writings of psychologically minded philosophers,
such as David Hume. Hume played an especially
noteworthy role in the history of psychology, and,
implicitly in the history of psychophysics. Building
on the work of Hobbes, Locke, and Berkeley, Hume
sought psychological answers to questions that had
theretofore largely been treated from a “rational”, or
philosophical, perspective. To try to answer
epistemological questions – How may we know
whether a statement is true? How can knowledge be
justified – Hume first reformulated the questions
themselves, asking: How is knowledge acquired and
constituted? Hume then answered by saying (to
summarize crudely): through experience
(empiricism), and by the workings of the mind
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(association, hedonism). The very title of Hume’s
major work, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739),
indicates the thrust of his approach. To Hume,
perceptions constitute the raw ingredients of mental
life, and within less than a century, scientists would
begin investigating the mechanisms, psychophysical
and neural, that underlie perceptual experience.
Bentham’s utilitarianism
Already by the late 18th century, the
psychological principles of empiricism,
associationism, and hedonism would find a
comfortable haven, by way of Hume, in the writings
of Jeremy Bentham, where these principles would
form the backbone to his theory of utilitarianism.
Utilitarianism, broadly construed, sought a scientific
framework for political and moral decision-making
(Bentham, 1781/1948). Utilitarianism aimed to do this
by applying computational formulas to subjective
(psychological, mental) quantities. From the
perspective of utilitarianism, even the Aristotelian
virtues, as I shall argue, may be translated into a set of
psychological quantities – utilities, in Bentham’s terms
– that operate within appropriately formulated
mathematical equations.
Bentham’s (1781/1948) proposal is well
known: “By utility is meant that property in any object,
whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage,
pleasure, good or happiness ... or to prevent the
happening of mischief, pain, evil or unhappiness to
the party whose interest is considered” (p. 2). Utility,
designated here as U, represents the psychological
value or subjective worthiness of a stimulus object.
To broaden the concept, U may be negative as well as
positive, where a negative utility would refer to a
property in an object that, to paraphrase Bentham,
produces rather than ameliorates mischief, pain, evil
or unhappiness. As a psychological entity, utility
implicitly entails a psychophysics.
At the very least, Bentham’s formulation
requires that, for a given individual at any moment in
time, we can rank order the values of U associated
with objects or properties that give “pleasure, good or
happiness”, such as wealth, gains or losses in income,
and so forth. By ranking the relevant set of utilities
(and assessing their probabilities, or subjective
probabilities), a decision-maker might then take
whatever course of action leads to the greatest value
of U. Of course, the strengths and weaknesses of
various forms of utilitarianism have been debated for
more than three centuries now, and it is not possible
here even to outline the main ethical, logical, and
psychological issues (Smart & Williams, 1973) –
although I should note that several variants of
utilitarianism are considerably more subtle than
Bentham’s. The present goal is not to enter the debate
over the adequacy of utilitarianism as a philosophical,
economic, or psychological theory, but instead to
identify and consider the psychophysical implications
of Bentham’s theory.
Bentham’s utilitarianism went well beyond the
ranking of utilities. For Bentham wanted utilitarianism
to contribute to social, economic, and political
decision-making as well as individual judgment, and
in order to accomplish this he had to assume that
utilities are measurable quantities. Further, Bentham
proposed to compute utilities not only for a given
individual but also across individuals, for a society at
large. Thus, utility to society as a whole could be
computed from “the sum of the interests of the several
members who compose it” (Bentham, 1781/1948, p.
2), providing a measure of the overall or net utility.
Net utility, U*, may be written as
U* = SU+i,k + SU 
-
j,k ,       (1)
where U+ and U- are the positive and negative
utilities associated, respectively, with objects i and j
for individual k. For the purposes of political decision-
making, and in a spirit consistent with contemporary
communitarianism, Bentham offered a rule for
maximizing or optimizing. Simply stated, one should
choose whichever option produces the greatest value
of U*. “The greatest good for the greatest number”,
defined here as the maximal value of U*, became the
credo of utilitarianism.
Psychophysical Consequences
Bentham’s utilitarianism has several
consequences that are relevant to psychophysics. To
start, let me reiterate that utilities are psychological
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quantities, and these quantities are, in some instances,
related to physical objects in the world or their
properties, but are not identical to them. According
to Bentham, utility depends on pleasure and pain,
and pleasure and pain, in turn, have a force or
psychological strength that depends on such variables
as intensity, duration, certainty, proximity, and the
pleasures or pains that follow. Bentham’s notion of
utility is ipso facto psychophysical. Further, it has
been commonly believed, from before the time of
Bentham, that utility follows a psychophysical rule
of diminishing gains: Each successive increase in
wealth or goods adds a smaller and smaller amount
of marginal utility. A century and a half earlier, in
1724, Cramer suggested a square root function, and
in 1738, Bernoulli suggested a logarithmic function
(Stevens, 1975). In both cases, the mathematical
function F relating measures of utility, U, to
magnitudes of wealth or commodities, W, has a
negative second derivative (decreasing marginal
utility), so that
U = F(W) (2)
and
d2U/(dW)2 < 0 (3)
Given a rule of diminishing marginal gains,
it may be possible to satisfy Bentham’s principle of
maximizing total utility U* by distributing total W
uniformly over individuals. Note that this conclusion
requires several auxiliary assumptions, for example,
that any steps taken to spread W equally would not
substantially decrease the total value of W, and that
the psychophysical function F governing utility (and
disutility) is uniform over individuals. Neither of
these auxiliary assumptions is, of course, indubitable.
First, it is likely that the very process of distributing
wealth, or certainly of redistributing it, would modify
people’s behaviors in a way that might well affect
the total quantity of W to be distributed. And second,
it is likely that the psychophysical functions do vary
over individuals, an issue discussed later (Sen, 1973).
There is a related matter that cuts even more
deeply to the heart of Bentham’s utilitarianism.
Equation 1 itself makes several tacit assumptions,
and an important one is that the measures of U+ and
U- are commensurable over individuals (Harsanyi,
1955). This assumption does not require that people
be psychophysically equivalent – that everyone’s
utility function obey the same form of Equation 2,
for example – but simply that different individual
utility functions, F1, F2, …, Fn, characterize values
of U that have a common unit. What the principle of
commensurability does say is that we must be able
to perform arithmetic operations by combining Jill’s
pleasure with Jack’s pain, that in the Benthamian
Equation 1 we may freely sum utilities over the
individuals.
If a utilitarian system is to be adequate, it
will have to address doubts regarding
commensurability over individuals.
Commensurability is a matter to which psychologists
have given relatively short shrift – we seem most
comfortable comparing behavioral measures,
measures of performance, such as the heights of pole
vault or standardized scores on Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale, where the units of measurement
come from physics or from counting correct and
incorrect responses. And psychologists tend, quite
properly, to be circumspect in what they say about
inferred mental entities for which there are no
“natural units” or whose constancy over individuals
seems dubious. Despite the deep-seated reluctance
to compare mental entities per se across different
individuals, it is important to keep in mind that
commensurability, like utility itself, has important
practical as well as theoretical implications.
Leaving ontological considerations aside, a
coherent system for comparing utilities across people
is at least plausible. It is plausible because, in one
domain of psychophysics at least, namely the
perception of fatigue during dynamic physical work,
laboratory and clinical research by (Borg, 1982) has
provided a practical and widely applied methodology
for interindividual comparison. Borg’s system for
measuring and comparing perceptions of fatigue is
based on several explicit postulates. The most
important of these states that, given some
constraining conditions, different individuals
working at their maximal physical capacity all
experience approximately the same level of perceived
exertion. It follows that, by measuring each person’s
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perception relative to his or her own maximum, the
resulting measures become commensurable over
individuals. Borg’s scheme has been remarkably
successful in predicting, for example, physiological
responses to submaximal levels of physical exercise.
If it were generally the case that everyone
experiences the same perceptual magnitude at the
sensory maximum in a given domain, the problem
of interindividual comparison would be readily
resolved. Unfortunately, the domain of perceived
exertion seems an exception rather than the rule. In
my own laboratory, for instance, when presenting
subjects with strong stimuli taken from two sensory
domains (taste and hearing) we have often observed
clear individual differences in relative response –
some subjects indicating that the taste sensations
were markedly stronger than the auditory, other that
the sounds were markedly stronger than the tastes.
The implication is that the magnitude of the
experiences at (extrapolated) maximum differs across
individuals in at least one of the modalities, and
perhaps in both. Measuring perceptions relative to
maximum does not always ensure commensurability.
Even if the domain of exertion is unique in this
respect, however, it might be possible to start with
measures of exertion and use these as leverage, or
common currency, to measure commensurable
quantities in other perceptual and cognitive domains,
such as utility.
Even if the matter of commensurability
across individuals can be resolved, there is still the
matter of commensurability within the domain of
utility itself. That is, it is possible that utility is a
disjunctive concept – constituting a manifold of
noncommensurable quantities. Recall Bentham’s
(1781/1948) definition – that utility comprises
whatever confers “benefit, advantage, pleasure, good
or happiness”, a list that may not even be inclusive.
It is not prima facie evident that “benefit”, for
example, is identical to “good”, or that “pleasure” is
identical to “happiness”. To be sure, the term utility
itself suggests a property of being useful, or beneficial
(and hence to many connotes what is crass, making
it in some ways a most unhappy choice of terms) –
yet Bentham’s principle is often called a maxim of
greatest happiness or greatest good, as if there is
sufficient equivalence in Bentham’s list for utility to
rest on some kind of common currency.
Elsewhere (Marks, 1992b), I’ve called this
assumption of equivalence Plato’s principle – for
Plato was among the first to claim a possible unitary
basis for deciding when actions are just, and Plato
was among the first to claim, in the Protagoras
(though elsewhere he would deny it) that “pleasure”
mediates the “good”. Furthermore, in that same
dialogue, Plato argued that pleasure and pain are
quantities, and thus are directly comparable. This
argument has had a long history, pervading quarters
of psychology as disparate as psychoanalysis and
psychophysics (Marks, 1992a).
The matter of commensurability over
objects, events, situations, is orthogonal to the matter,
mentioned earlier, of commensurability over people.
Even so, there are two ways to assert that objects are
commensurable – a strong way and a weak way. The
strong claim is Plato’s, namely, that utility has a
common currency – that pleasure, good, happiness,
benefit, and whatever else share a common metric.
A weaker claim is that various kinds of pleasure or
good or happiness are, though qualitatively different,
nevertheless commensurable and thus
interchangeable.
It would be fruitless, if not impossible, to
try to uphold the stronger claim without also
maintaining the weaker one: If we cannot compare
different kinds of happiness or pleasure or benefit,
how are we to locate the Platonic “one” in the
“many”? But viewed optimistically, happiness or
utility is amenable to natural law, and in the utilitarian
metric of Equation 1, every i, every j, every k, is a
Newtonian particle, buffeted by the prevailing forces
of socio-physical nature, if not quite “created equal”
under the ethos or laws of the land then at least
commensurable under the laws of natural philosophy.
The problems posed by commensurability
become exaggerated the more sophisticated the
utilitarian theory becomes. John Stuart Mill’s (1863/
1964) version, for example, while seeking to
promulgate the virtue of virtue (so to speak), in order
to clear the grounds for “higher pleasures” and
thereby avoid the seemingly crude hedonism implied
by Bentham, only exacerbates the problem of
comparability. But commensurability may be
unavoidable. For even when (or though) the demands,
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desires, and obligations of the moment appear
independent of one another, and thus qualitatively
dissimilar, the process of choosing itself forces
comparison. And by forcing comparison, choosing
may thereby itself impose commensurability. In this
regard, commensurability is intrinsic also to
approaches to decision-making and ethical theories
that are non-utilitarian, such as the neo-Kantian
position of Rawls (1971) e Marks (1992b).
Utility, Value, and Valence
Psychology has shared part of its history with
other disciplines, including economics, philosophy,
and biology, and one consequence has been the
development of cross-disciplinary connections, albeit
fuzzy ones, among utilitarian theories in the domains
of ethics, economic decision-making, and even neo-
Darwinism. Some years ago, Cooper (1987) argued
that theories of rational choice and utility could be
derived from principles of evolutionary biology. In
Cooper’s view, utility is closely allied to the notion
of fitness.
A decade ago, Cabanac (1992) recast Plato’s
claim in a contemporary biological context.
Cabanac’s goal is to zero in on the physiological
systems or devices, behavioral and physiological, that
mediate the ways that organisms choose their
responses. By focusing on homeostatic mechanisms,
Cabanac infers the “paramount importance of
pleasure in the determination of behavior” (p. 173):
an experimental confirmation, he asserts, of two
millennia of philosophic speculation. Like Bentham
and Mill, Cabanac argues that utility rests on pleasure,
but he goes even further by claiming that pleasure
can therefore serve as a theoretical bridge from
biology to psychology, and by implication to related
disciplines such as economics.
Although the data obtained from Cabanac’s
clever experimental designs – which produced
behavioral/psychophysical/economic indifference
curves – suggest that people behave as though they
optimize something, and although his subjects report
on their “pleasure” in ways that suggest that the
internal mental/biological states stand in one-to-one
correspondence with what they optimize, still, a
skeptic may remain unconvinced of Cabanac’s
theoretical claims. It is a far cry from the conditions
tested in his experiments – where Cabanac’s subjects
trade off physical work for changes in ambient
temperature, or trade off greater sweetness for less
sourness in a beverage – to the conclusion that
different forms of pleasure are sufficiently
commensurable to serve as the basis for a utilitarian
theory of behavior. Consequently, a skeptic is likely
to remain unconvinced that these data provide
adequate support for what is ultimately a
nonempirical claim, to wit, that “[human liberty] is
the freedom to choose one’s own way to maximize
pleasure” (Cabanac, 1992, p. 197). When a person
chooses among the alternatives that are available
within a well-defined and strongly circumscribed set
of conditions, that person’s decisions, however
systematic and well articulated in their structure, may
nonetheless reflect contingencies that are unique to
their contextual setting.
Cabanac (1992) like others implies that
wealth, or a bundle of commodities, is a convenient
substitute for something else – a stand-in for what
is commonly called utility, which Cabanac
characterizes in terms of pleasure, but which I would
prefer to call valence, appropriating for this purpose
a term used by Lewin (1936). Although Cabanac’s
stance serves a useful purpose in reminding us that
biology undoubtedly plays an ineluctable role in
economic and other kinds of behavior, nevertheless,
I believe that his argument needs to be
reconceptualized and reformulated. Most
importantly, it needs to be rescued from an overly
reductive physiological framework, and to do this
it is critical to recognize that pleasures may, and
commonly do, become valences or values, but that
this happens only when biology becomes cognition,
and thus it is critical to recognize that not all
pleasures-that-become-values are easily derived –
and some do not derive at all – from biological
needs.
Perhaps most importantly, in my view it may
be necessary to conceptualize human behavior so that
it is seen not as a hierarchically-organized system
comprising subsets of well-defined and universal
mental and behavioral processes, but instead as a
looser set of capacities linked only weakly one with
another, perhaps through heuristic strategies, which
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in turn are defined by and instantiated in the particular
tasks in which they arise.
On the Contextuality of Valence
That all decisions are contextual is, no doubt,
a truism in psychology. But my argument goes
further: Contextual constraints may define the
utilities themselves, and thus delimit the valences
afforded by those outcomes that matter to us.
Valences and values are construals and constructions.
This position is related to, and sympathetic with,
views that have been voiced by other psychologists,
notably by Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
Birnbaum, Mellers, and their colleagues (Birnbaum,
Coffey, Mellers, & Weiss, 1992; Mellers, Ordónez,
& Birnbaum, 1992) have also focused on contextual
processes in decision-making. Their interpretation
may seem to differ from mine, but I suspect that our
stances are ultimately compatible – a matter of where
in the mathematical equations to place weighting
coefficients.
Biologically oriented thinkers, such as
Cabanac (1992), commonly fail to make a distinction
that I believe is crucial: Where needs are biological,
values are social – and often cultural. Indeed, the
very language in which we formulate and represent
the “human condition”, the terms through which we
assay alternatives, by which we scale consequences,
is a social construction and convention. To be sure,
the capacity for language is biological, an evolved
characteristic. But discourse has what philosophers
call intentionality or meaning, and meaning, like
utility, valence, and value, is psychological. We
humans can assess situations requiring choice before
they happen, and we can weigh the values of the
objects, events, and conditions that are relevant to
our choices. We are able to do this because we have
evolved cognitive systems and strategies for
representing knowledge. These systems enable us to
predict outcomes, to imagine consequences, to hope
for pleasures of the flesh and mind, and to fear pains
that may afflict the body and the soul. Our mental
and behavioral organs are highly flexible and
adaptive. We can run on automatic pilot, as when we
make implicit visual-motor decisions while, say,
riding a bicycle or driving a car; and we can
deliberate, as when we decide whether to change jobs
or buy a home.
Because we often must choose among
incompatible alternatives and competing obligations,
we defer to – and perhaps in doing so define – the
valence that applies to each. However biological their
origins, valences are typically modulated or
channeled through social practices or cultural
experiences, as when we choose between red wine
and white. How much more so, then, when Antigone
had to choose between obedience to her uncle Creon
and the social duty to bury her brother, or when
Thomas More had to choose between obedience to
his king and duty to his church! To be sure, many
day-to-day decisions rest on pleasures based in
biological needs; but even our biological needs, our
drives for nourishment and for sex, filter through a
cultural colander, unfolding through socially
constrained or formulated valences or values. By this
token, the common, Platonic view – that what is good
or pleasurable is unitary – is erroneous, based on the
misconception that utilities, valences, or values
necessarily preexist or inhere in the mind’s calculus
prior to the act of deciding. Instead, it is often those
very acts that delineate the valences or values, and
thus confer commensurability. Perhaps there would
be virtue to eliminating the essentialism that pervades
the common view.
These considerations speak to one of the
unhappy consequences of Bentham’s brand of
utilitarianism, as noted by Sen (1973, 1990), among
others. As mentioned earlier, utilitarianism has been
taken by some to endorse or underpin an equal
distribution of resources, but it need not do so. Indeed,
to the extent that people differ in their utilities,
optimization may dictate a distribution of resources
that exacerbates inequality rather than ameliorating
it. Utilitarian schemes may become pernicious “when
the mental characteristics of pleasure or desire adjust
to situations of persistent inequality. In circumstances
of long-standing disparity and inequity, the underdogs
may come to regard their fate as fairly inescapable
... [and] ... learn to adjust their desires and pleasures
accordingly...” (Sen, 1990, p. 51). This state of affairs
has led Sen to affirm the priority of human freedom
over utilities, and to focus on human capabilities.
These concerns may be ameliorated,
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however, by taking utilitarianism as a framework for
decision-making based more broadly upon valences
and concomitant social values, for valences and
values can depend on wide range of cultural, social,
and behavioral norms and practices. Consequently,
the utilitarian calculus could give heavy weight, to,
say, opportunities to maximize individual potential,
or more generally to Aristotelian virtues – this
perhaps being accomplished more easily when
utilitarianism is based in rules (rule utilitarianism)
rather than acts (act utilitarianism). But any
quantitative scale, or valuation, of the virtues would,
of course, itself reflect their cultural and social
priorities (MacIntyre, 1984; Nussbaum, 1990).
Although the claim is often made that such an
approach trivializes utilitarianism, the situation is
quite the opposite: The approach suggested here
highlights the importance of relating the
psychophysical properties of utility theory to the
psychological processes that give rise to the
underlying valences that serve as psychophysical
quantities. As suggested earlier, these valences may
sometimes derive from the process of decision-
making itself.
A deeper understanding of the mechanisms
that underlie valences may be critical to political,
social, and economic decision-making. Decisions are
made all of the time, at both the “micro” and the
“macro” level, by individuals, by corporations, and
by governments.  Many values and valences are
learnable, and many surely are learned. To give one
example, Eisenberger (1992) has investigated the
“work ethic”, mounting considerable evidence to
show that “industriousness” is, or at least can be,
conditioned through well-known principles of
associative learning. More generally, valences and
values arise within a framework of social and cultural
practices, themselves transmitted through experience
and learning. Not only can valences and values be
learned, but surely they can also be taught. This
message was not lost on John Dewey (1916), who
recognized the singular role of educational reform
as a means to achieve social progress.
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